20 ideas
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |