15 ideas
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |