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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Phaedrus' and 'On Denoting'

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74 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is self-motion [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato]
'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We should follow the law in public, and nature in private [Antiphon]
To gain the greatest advantage only treat law as important when other people are present [Antiphon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The way you spend your time will form your character [Antiphon]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy [Antiphon]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato]