Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Intensions Revisited'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
12268 Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
602 Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
13591 Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
8483 Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
13588 A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
13592 Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
1664 I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
21385 Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
2631 Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero]