14 ideas
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 21867 | Conatus is brain circuits seeking survival and well-being [Damasio] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 22594 | In 1794 France all individual and legal rights were suppressed by the general will [Dunt] |
| 22602 | Over several centuries a set of eight main liberal values was established [Dunt] |
| 22596 | No government, or the whole nation, can control an individual beyond legitimate scope [Dunt] |
| 22603 | Laissez-faire liberalism failed to give people the protections and freedoms needed for a good life [Dunt] |
| 22592 | Nationalism pretends that we can only have a single identity [Dunt] |