Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'On the analysis of moral judgements' and 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


30 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer]
A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]