Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete' and 'Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher'

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9 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
In early Greece the word for punishment was also the word for vengeance [Vlastos]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]