13 ideas
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |