12 ideas
16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |