17 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |