13 ideas
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |