51 ideas
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
| 15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
| 15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
| 15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
| 4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
| 4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
| 4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
| 4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
| 4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
| 4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
| 4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
| 4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
| 4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |