23 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |