75 ideas
7846 | Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
20107 | How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche] |
20352 | Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
20379 | Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
20123 | First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche] |
20105 | Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche] |
20376 | We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
22500 | Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche] |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
20128 | Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
22503 | Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
8041 | The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche] |
20135 | Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
20353 | The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
20113 | Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche] |
22475 | Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
22476 | Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
20104 | Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche] |
7847 | Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
9782 | Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek] |
20102 | Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche] |
20106 | Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski] |
20124 | Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche] |
20367 | Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche] |
20371 | Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
20108 | Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |