19 ideas
10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |