Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' and 'Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]