69 ideas
15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |