Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics' and 'A Defense of Presentism'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14001 People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
13991 Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
17807 To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
17806 It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17808 Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
15642 If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
15645 Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
15643 Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14002 Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
14000 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15641 Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
13990 Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
13992 Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
13994 Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
13995 Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
13996 Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
13997 Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
13993 Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
13998 Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
13999 People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]