Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'The Iliad' and 'Contingent Identity'

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23 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
15642 If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
15645 Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
15643 Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
2170 Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
2171 The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
21819 Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
11388 Let there be one ruler [Homer]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15641 Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
14829 Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche]