87 ideas
| 3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
| 3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
| 3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
| 3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
| 3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
| 3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
| 3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
| 15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
| 15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
| 15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
| 1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
| 21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
| 21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
| 1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
| 3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
| 23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
| 23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
| 3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
| 3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
| 3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
| 3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
| 1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
| 3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
| 3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
| 3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
| 3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
| 1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
| 21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
| 3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
| 3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
| 3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
| 21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
| 21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
| 21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
| 21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
| 21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
| 1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
| 1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
| 3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
| 3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
| 3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
| 3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
| 3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
| 3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
| 3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
| 3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| 3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
| 3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
| 3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
| 3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
| 3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
| 3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
| 3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
| 3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
| 3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
| 3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
| 3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
| 3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
| 3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
| 3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
| 3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
| 3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
| 3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
| 3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
| 3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
| 3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
| 3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
| 3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
| 3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| 3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
| 3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
| 15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
| 3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
| 3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |