12 ideas
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
| 15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
| 15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| 15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |