20 ideas
2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |