19 ideas
7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |