20 ideas
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |