Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives' and '14: Superstition'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


10 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Absurd superstitions make people atheist, not disharmony in nature [Plutarch]