Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'Ontological Ground of Alethic Modality' and 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]