Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'What is it like to be a bat?' and 'To be is to be the value of a variable..'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
15642 If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
15645 Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
15643 Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3286 An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3288 Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
4883 Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
3287 We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
4989 Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15641 Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]