Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Essences and Kinds', 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula' and 'Modal Logic'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
14970 Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
14971 D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14972 S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14973 In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
14976 Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
14974 A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
15642 If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
15645 Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
15643 Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14975 A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15641 Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]