13 ideas
13639 | Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro] |
21557 | Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |