12 ideas
| 16608 | Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
| 16599 | Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
| 16681 | Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham] |
| 15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
| 15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
| 15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
| 12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
| 12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
| 12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
| 15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |