Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'W.V. Quine' and 'A Powers Theory of Modality'

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29 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
12463 Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8472 Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8476 Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8480 S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
8474 Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
8465 Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
8452 Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
8475 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
8454 The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8473 The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
8458 Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
14375 If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
14378 Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
12467 Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
14377 Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14376 States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14379 Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14372 Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12466 All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
14371 We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12465 Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12464 If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
12469 Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
8457 The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
8477 People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8471 Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
8484 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]