18 ideas
| 10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
| 19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
| 10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
| 10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
| 10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
| 19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
| 19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
| 19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
| 19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
| 19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
| 19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
| 19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
| 19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
| 19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
| 19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |