32 ideas
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |