46 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |