Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Pragmatism and Deflationism' and 'Truth-makers and dependence'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19108 Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
19094 For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
19105 Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
19100 Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
19099 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
19103 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19101 Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
19096 Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
19106 Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19098 Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
19104 Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19109 The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]