15 ideas
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |