59 ideas
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |