13 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |