74 ideas
| 11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
| 11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
| 14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
| 11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
| 11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
| 11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
| 11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
| 10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
| 14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
| 11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
| 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
| 11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
| 14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
| 11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
| 11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
| 11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
| 11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
| 11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
| 11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
| 11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
| 11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
| 11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
| 11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
| 11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
| 4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
| 4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
| 11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
| 4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
| 4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
| 4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
| 4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
| 4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
| 11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
| 11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
| 4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
| 4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
| 4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
| 4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
| 4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
| 4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
| 4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
| 4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
| 4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
| 4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
| 4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
| 4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
| 4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
| 4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
| 4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
| 4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
| 4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
| 4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
| 4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
| 4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
| 4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
| 4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
| 4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
| 4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
| 4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |