Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Foundations of Mathematics' and 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

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28 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13430 Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
13428 Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13427 Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
13334 Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
13426 Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
13425 Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6473 Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
22328 I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6466 Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6467 No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
6483 Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
8244 Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
6462 Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
6463 Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
6464 Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
6459 We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
6460 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
6461 Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6458 Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
6469 Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22325 A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
6470 Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
6468 There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]