Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Truthmakers' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

30 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18486 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18484 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18473 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
18481 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18479 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
18477 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18482 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18474 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
18485 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
18490 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
18493 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18489 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18476 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18480 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
18471 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18475 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18478 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]