81 ideas
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naïve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |