Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'To be is to be the value of a variable..' and 'Objects and Persons'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6123 Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
6143 Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
6135 A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
6145 Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6124 I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]
6134 Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
6125 We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
14229 Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins]
6142 The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks]
14472 If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson]
14469 Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
6137 Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
6127 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]
6131 Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]
6132 Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]
6141 There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
6130 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
6138 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
6128 Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
6136 Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
6133 If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6150 The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
6144 You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
6140 Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
6149 Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
6148 Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
6146 Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks]
6147 The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]