Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method' and 'The Limits of Contingency'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano]
PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock]
Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]