42 ideas
| 12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
| 15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
| 15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
| 15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
| 12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
| 12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
| 12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
| 15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
| 12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
| 12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
| 12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
| 12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
| 12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
| 12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
| 15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
| 12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
| 12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
| 15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
| 15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
| 15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
| 15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
| 15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
| 15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
| 15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
| 15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
| 15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
| 15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
| 15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
| 15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
| 15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
| 15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
| 15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
| 15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
| 15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
| 15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
| 15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
| 15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
| 15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| 12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |