Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws)' and 'Negation'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett]
Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]