34 ideas
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| 13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
| 10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
| 9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
| 9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
| 9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
| 9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| 9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
| 11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |