Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Thinking and Experience' and 'Negation'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
18781 Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18789 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
18790 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
18787 Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
18793 Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
18784 In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
18786 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
18780 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18782 The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
18783 Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18792 Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
18785 Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
18788 For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14329 Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9032 Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
9035 If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
9034 There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
9036 There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
9037 Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9033 Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9030 Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
9029 If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9031 The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18791 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]