35 ideas
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |