53 ideas
21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |